The origins of the Great War

On April 24th I attended a discussion at my local Durham County Library entitled "The Great War: From Single Political Event to Global War." The event was sponsored by Sister Cities of Durham and the Durham Library Foundation Humanities Society. The presenter was Richard Hill, who taught history in the Durham County Public School System for 32 years, is well traveled, and certainly knows his history.

The presentation was well-attended but I was by far the youngest person there (mean age I would say ~55). Any-who...

As Hill pointed out, most discussions of WWI begin with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire, and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 by a 19-year-old student and Yugoslav nationalist, Gavrilo (Gabriel) Princip. The assassination is a fascinating story in and of itself, and involved a good deal of dumb luck, happenstance, and coincidence (the lead driver for the Imperial cavalcade, for example, made a wrong turn down a side street, which is where Princip, gun in hand, just happened to be). Hill then showed some movie clips of soldiers marching past cheering crowds from a site called CriticalPast, which has tons of historic stock footage, some of which dates to WWI. Here is some footage of the funeral for the Archduke:

Hill continued by showing a slide with a bunch of small, difficult-to-read text. This was intentional, though, as his point was to show that assassinations of political figures was actually an extremely common occurrence between the 1890s and the first decades of the 20th century (the US was not exempt from this pattern−William McKinley, anyone?). So, the assassination itself was not to blame. A better question is why was this assassination, at this time and this place, is the only one to have sparked a major conflict. The answer, Hill argued, was a combination of:

• Rising nationalism. It has to be remembered that some of the belligerents were only recently unified into nations that we would recognize today. Hill showed a map of Europe at the end of the 17th century to highlight the fact that Germany and Italy in particular were hodgepodges of associated but independent entities that were not unified until the 1870s. (In fact, the German Empire was officially declared in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in 1871 following the Prussian defeat of France.) With the rise of these states, an increased sense of nationalism and, thus, national honor, emerged. One manifestation of this was the growth of the German navy, which, it was hoped, would compete with Britain for mastery of the seas (suffice it to say, Britain felt quite threatened by this).

Europe on the eve of the Great War. Courtesy of europeaninstitute.org

• Alliances. A complex web of alliances formed throughout the late 19th and early 20th century within (and outside) Europe. The major agreements were: (1) the Triple Alliance, first formed in 1882 between Austria-Hungary and the recently unified Italy and Germany, and, (2) largely in reaction to the Triple Alliance, the Triple Entente (or "Understanding"), which in 1884 involved France and Russia and, after 1907, Great Britain. It is important to note that the Entente should be recognized for what it was, an understanding, rather than as a binding treaty. It was not a given, for example, even up until the outbreak of hostilities, that Britain would come to the aid of France, Russia, and Belgium. Nevertheless, these (and other) agreements ultimately forced the powers to react. 

• Military strategy. Other than Britain, compulsory, and universal, military service was a part of life for citizens of many European countries, which meant that most of the major powers could field potentially massive armies at any time (in the millions). This created significant logistical problems, as these armies had to be called up, fed, equipped and, perhaps most importantly, transported to the right place at the right time. The timing and location of hostilities were in fact absolutely critical−the discussions among military leaders clearly reveal the obsession with getting the battle-ready troops to strategic points before their enemies. This was especially true for Germany, who expected to have to fight on two fronts. One could scarcely think of a situation more conducive to rash decisions. In fact, Germany planned to commit massive forces to the Western Front to quickly bring France to her knees before turning its attention to Russia in the east. France, expecting the Germans to attack from the north through Belgium (as they eventually did), hoped to initially defend against the German onslaught before thrusting across the frontier towards the Rhine. Russia was committed to an invasion of East Prussia (to prevent a massing of German arms to the west) and an attack to their southwest to defend Slavic populations from Austro-Hungarian aggression. Britain, for her part, hoped to depend heavily, and almost exclusively, on her powerful navy.   

The Germans' planned envelopment of the French army (red) and France's thrust
towards the Rhine (blue). Courtesy of westpoint.edu

• Colonial networks. Hill stated that colonialism did play a subsidiary role in the war. Asian states, for example, were increasingly resisting the expansionist policies of European nations, a process that led to the humiliating defeat by Japan of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Russia also sought an exit to the Mediterranean and was thus always looking to lop off pieces of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, and Britain wanted control of the Suez Canal to ensure quick passage to her Indian possessions, and these powers were intent on protecting these interests.

• General factors. This last category was kind of a catch-all for other important causes. Hill first noted the incredible advances in communication technology−telephones, wireless devices, motion pictures−that permitted an unprecedented ability to disseminate information to massive audiences and, thus, to influence (and, in many cases, deceive) the public. Rapid advances in military technology also led to an arms race among the great powers (recall Germany's construction of a state-of-the-art navy to rival Britain's). 

So, what caused the cataclysm that became the Great War? Hill brought things full circle to argue that:

1. Europe lacked a system with the ability and authority to mediate international disputes. Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations proposal as part of his 1919 fourteen-point piece plan was mean to fill this void (it was created in 1920, although the United States never joined). Closely tied to this factor was the inability (or refusal) of existing states to add new political units.

2. The destructive power of modern mechanized warfare was tragically under-appreciated. Of course, it's not like there weren't warning signs: the horrifying capabilities of machine guns, for example, were evident both in Britain's colonial wars and in the Russo-Japanese War.

3. A willingness on the part of the great powers to go to war in order to maintain national unity.

During the Q & A session, one audience member referred to a documentary that he had seen claiming that a (if not the) main cause of the war was actually the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad, which was being constructed by the Germans to ensure a steady supply of oil from the Middle East for her growing navy. There does seem to be some merit to this claim, and it does fit nicely in Hill's "Colonial networks" theme. UPDATE 10.14.16: I am currently listening to Chris Clark's The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, which is a really, really comprehensive look at the roots of the war. It the book, he relates how the Germans, under pressure from the British, gave up plans to run the line all the way to the Persian Gulf, which largely muted British opposition.

Really interesting event. Kudos to the sponsors and to Mr. Hill...